Health financing at district level in Malawi: an analysis of the distribution of funds at two points in time. by Borghi, Josephine et al.
Title: Health financing at district level in Malawi: an analysis of the distribution of funds at two points 
in time  
Authors: Borghi J1, Munthali S2, Million L.B3, Martinez-Alvarez M1 
 
Author Affiliations 
1. London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, London, UK 
2. University of Malawi, Zomba, Malawi 
3. Malawi National Statistics Office 
 
 
 
Contact Author 
Josephine Borghi 
Department of Global Health and Development 
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 
15-17 Tavistock Place 
London WC1H 9SH 
Tel: 02079272090 
Email: Josephine.borghi@lshtm.ac.uk 
 
Running Title: District-level financing for health in Malawi 
Key words: sub-national, health financing, Malawi, district, equity, child health 
Word count: 5628 
 
Acknowledgements 
This work was funded through a sub-grant from the U.S. Fund for UNICEF under their Countdown to 
2015 for Maternal, Newborn and Child Survival Grant (#OPP1058954) from the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation. We would also like to thank everyone who took part in their interviews for 
sharing their time and expertise with us.  We thank Ken Hill, Mercy Kanyuka, Jameson Ndawala,  
 Tiope Mleme,  Lusungu Chisesa and Medson Makwemba for sharing the data on mortality 
outcomes. 
  
 Key Messages 
-There is substantial variation in levels of health financing across districts in Malawi 
-Districts in Malawi are heavily reliant on external financing for health, with domestic funds coming 
late and below levels budgeted  
- Districts with higher levels of domestic and external financing had lower levels of post-neonatal 
mortality, and those with higher levels of out-of-pocket payments had higher levels of mortality in 
earlier years, but there was no association between changes in financing levels and outcomes over 
time. 
 
Abstract 
There is growing attention to tracking country level resource flows, but limited evidence on the sub-
national allocation of funds.  We examined district health financing levels in Malawi in 2006 and 2011, 
and equity in the allocation of funding, together with the association between financing and under 
five and neonatal mortality.  We explored the process for receiving and allocating different funding 
sources at district level.    
We obtained domestic and external financing data from the Integrated Financial Management 
Information System (2006-2011) and AidData (2000-2012) databases. Out-of-pocket payment data 
came from two rounds of integrated household budget surveys (2005; 2010).  Mortality data came 
from the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (2006) and Demographic and Health Survey (2010).  We 
describe district level funding by source, ran correlations between funding and outcomes and 
generated concentration curves and indices.  41 semi-structured interviews were conducted at the 
national level and in 10 districts with finance and health managers.  
Per capita spending from all sources varied substantially across districts and doubled between 2006 
and 2011 from 7,181 Kwacha to 15,312 Kwacha.  In 2011, external funding accounted for 74% of funds, 
with domestic funding accounting for 19% of expenditure, and out of pocket (OOP) funding accounting 
for 7%.  All funding sources were concentrated among wealthier districts, with OOP being the most 
pro-rich , followed by domestic expenditure and external funding.  Districts with higher levels of 
domestic and external financing had lower levels of post-neonatal mortality, and those with higher 
levels of out-of-pocket payments had higher levels of 1-59 month mortality in 2006. There was no 
association between changes in financing and outcomes.  Districts reported delayed receipt of lower-
than-budgeted funds, forcing them to scale-down activities and rely on external funding. 
Governments need to track how resources are allocated sub-nationally to maximise equity and ensure 
allocations are commensurate to health need.   
 
  
Introduction  
There is global recognition of the importance of health sector financing for strengthening health 
systems to improve health outcomes (WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health. 2001) 
(Makuta & O'Hare 2015) (Farag et al. 2013) including the need to generate more domestic resources 
for health as highlighted in the third international conference on financing and development in Addis 
Ababa.  The question of how to generate and invest funding to maximise access to affordable and 
efficient care is of concern to governments everywhere, and a particular challenge for low-income 
countries (LICs), where the government resource base is more limited.  In recognition of this, many 
country governments have developed health sector financing strategies, and integrated financing 
objectives into health sector plans.  Such strategies include mechanisms to enhance fiscal space for 
health by improving the efficiency of tax revenue collection (Pinder 2008) and finding ways to ensure 
pre-payment for health care among the informal sector through tax or insurance contributions 
(Crewson 1997).  Many governments have removed user fees for maternal and child health services 
(Hatt et al. 2013; Tore & Johannesson 2008), in a bid to reduce the burden of out of pocket 
payments and improve access to these services, reflecting an implicit commitment to increasing 
public funding for these services.  Global donors also continue to invest heavily in the health sector 
in LICs (Dieleman et al. 2016).    
With the increased focus on health financing, it is important to track resources to monitor progress 
towards addressing financing and broader health goals. Numerous studies have examined resource 
flows from development partners to the health sector and to specific population beneficiary groups 
(e.g. (Allen et al. 2017; Bénabou & Tirole 2006; Berdud et al. 2016; Frey & Jegen 2001; Gneezy et al. 
2011; Gneezy & Rustichini 2000; Jordan 1986; Zuckerman et al. 1978).  A number of studies have 
also sought to examine financing trends across a range of financing sources within the African region 
(Kirigia et al. 2006) (Sambo et al. 2013) (Nguyen et al. 2011).  There is now a growing interest in 
understanding the trends in health sector funding at the country level (Deci et al. 1999), including 
domestic and external funding and how these relate to out of pocket payments and the affordability 
of care.  A number of studies have examined trends in total health expenditure by source at country 
level drawing from national health accounts data in Nigeria (Lawanson et al. 2012), in China (Long et 
al. 2013), in Iran (Zakeri et al. 2015) and in Malawi, (Zere et al. 2010).  Others have examined 
financial flows to specific health areas, such as reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health 
(RMNCH) at country level in Kenya (Sidze et al. 2013), Namibia (Mbeeli et al. 2011) and Burundi 
(Chaumont et al. 2015).  However, making progress is contingent not only on generating sufficient 
resources at the national level, but also on funds being equitably allocated across sub-national areas 
(regions/districts) (Ensor et al. 2012).  Yet there is much less evidence of the availability of health 
sector funding at the sub-national level in countries. To our knowledge only three papers have 
examined sub-national funding levels, across China (Brixi et al. 2013), Peru and Pakistan (Lorenz & 
Khalid 2011), and one province of Iran (Mehrolhassani et al. 2014).  However, no studies were 
identified in Sub-Saharan Africa, and none considered how funding changed over time.  
This study adds to existing evidence by examining the levels of financing for health in Malawi at the 
district-level at two points in time: 2006 and 2011 and exploring the distribution of financing in relation 
to wealth, and the association between financing levels and neonatal, post-neonatal and under five 
mortality.  Malawi was chosen as a case due to the substantial reductions in child mortality achieved 
over the period 2000-2013, coupled with increased service coverage (Kanyuka et al. 2016).  This study 
was carried out as part of the Countdown project, a multi-disciplinary multi-institutional initiative 
tracking progress towards reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health (RMNCH) globally and at 
the country level, focusing on understanding the coverage, health system and financial factors 
explaining mortality improvements in countries.  
Study Setting 
Health Financing 
Total health expenditure in Malawi over the period 2006-2011 grew almost three-fold from 47 to 
129 billion Kwacha, though the share of the domestic budget allocated to health has been 
consistently less than the 15% recommended in the Abuja declaration (World Health Organization. 
2011), estimated at 7.2% in 2011 (Kanyuka et al. 2016).  Donor funding represented 66-70% of total 
health expenditure, with a fairly constant share of out of pocket payments at around 10% (Kanyuka 
et al. 2016).  Funding to priority areas has grown substantially, for example, there was a 6.3 fold 
increase in total funding to child health between 2006-2011 and a 3.6 fold increase in funding to 
maternal and newborn health and family planning, which is in large part driven by an increase in 
external funding to these areas from $31.2m in 2003 to $102.2m in 2012 for child health; and from 
$16.5m in 2003 to $42.6m in 2012 for maternal and newborn health (Kanyuka et al. 2016). 
 
 
Health care financing and management in Malawi is decentralised.  At the district level, health care is 
managed by a District Health Management Team (DHMT). Districts develop the District 
Implementation Plan (DIP), annual plans for health service delivery and related budgets, in 
consultation with providers and communities.    Districts receive  funds from the Ministry of Finance 
as block grants to cover district level health activities.  These funds originate from domestic sources 
(tax revenue) and from external sources, through general budget support.  Districts also received 
basket funding from donors, pooled funds for the health sector as part of the Sector Wide Approach 
(SWAP), since 2004.  These funds are channelled to districts through the Ministry of Health.  Donor 
funds can also be channelled straight to districts through the Local Government Financing Committee1 
or through non-government channels as vertical (discrete) programmes (Figure 1).  Health services at 
government facilities and at selected non-profit private facilities contracted by the Ministry of Health 
are officially free at the point of use (Chirwa et al. 2013).  However, in practice, if drugs are out of 
stock then patients will pay out of pocket at private pharmacies.  Patients also pay for care in private 
for profit facilities.   Out of pocket payments are not a source of financing for districts in Malawi, nor 
would levels of out of pocket payments be taken into account within resource allocation decisions. 
Child Health 
We focus on the relationship between financing and child health outcomes as reductions in under 
five mortality in Malawi have been substantial between 1990 and 2013, from 247 deaths (90% CI 
234–262) per 1,000 livebirths to 71 deaths (58–83) in 2013, representing an annual decline of 5.4% 
(Kanyuka et al. 2016).  Much of the decline was in the 1–59 months age group, with neonatal 
mortality declining at a slower rate (from 50 to 23 deaths per 1,000 livebirths), therefore, we also 
consider the relationship between financing and neonatal mortality.  District level financing primarily 
benefits primary care, of which pregnant women and children under five are substantial 
beneficiaries. 
 
Methods 
Time Frame 
We focus on the years 2006 and 2011, to examine financing in Malawi during the period after the 
introduction of the SWAP.  These are also the two years for which complete data were available 
from all financing sources, and with available mortality data from household surveys, enabling a 
comparison to be made between levels of financing and health-related outcomes.  However, it is 
important to note that financing data is not available for consistent time periods, as explained 
below, and in some cases the figures provided are estimates or proxies for the years of interest.  In 
our results we refer consistently to years 2006 and 2011. 
Data Sources 
                                                          
1 While general budget support (including SWAP) was suspended in Malawi from 2014 following a series of 
corruption scandals known as “cash gate”; at the time of the research donor funds were channelled as 
outlined here. 
Domestic Expenditure 
Approved district budget and revised budget figures from the Integrated Financial Management 
Information System (IFMS) system for financial years 2005/2006 and 2010/2011 were used as the 
closest proxies for domestic expenditures at district level for years 2006 and 2011.   In addition to 
central level domestic funding this also includes externally sourced general budget support which is 
channelled through the Ministry of Finance as well as locally collected revenues that do not go back 
to the central government level. 
External expenditure 
Data on external expenditure on health were obtained from the AidData database (Vecchio 1982), 
which provides information on donor funding for over 80% of all donors, reporting total donor 
disbursements per project, together with the years for which a project is active, for each district.  Data 
include funding through pooled funding mechanisms such as the sector wide approach and general 
budget support, however, in practice the latter funding were not present within the database.   The 
database provides information for each district, on project expenditures across all sectors.  
Expenditure figures are provided as totals for projects for the life time of the project.  Information is 
also available on the duration of the project (start and end years).  To calculate disbursements per 
district for the years 2006 and 2011, we restricted our analysis to those projects which were active in 
either of these years and were classified as being made to the health sector, and divided the total 
disbursement amount for a given project by the total number of years that the project was active to 
estimate annual disbursements.  No general budget support records were identified within the health 
sector.  Disbursements with information missing for a given year were not included.  
Out-of-pocket payments 
We derived data on annual out of pocket payments from two rounds of the Integrated Household 
Survey data that were closest to the years of focus in this study (2005 and 2010), a nationally 
representative survey of income and expenditure.  These figures were taken as proxies for out of 
pocket payments in 2006 and 2011.  The survey records out of pocket payments for the most recent 
outpatient visit, as well as the number of outpatient visits in the previous 4 weeks for every member 
in the household.  Total out of pocket payments were estimated as the sum of total outpatient and 
inpatient expenditures for each household. For each household member, we multiplied reported out 
of pocket payments for the most recent visit by the number of visits reported in the past 4 weeks, and 
multiplied this by 12 to estimate annual household expenditures on outpatient care.  The survey also 
asks respondents how many inpatient admissions they experienced in the previous 12 months, and 
out of pocket expenditure associated with the last admission.  We multiplied the number of 
admissions by the costs per admission to estimate annual household inpatient admission 
expenditures.  We estimated average annual costs per capita by dividing total household costs by the 
number of household members. We estimated total out of pocket expenditures by district by 
multiplying the average household cost by the estimated number of households in each district.  
Population, Socio-Economic Status and Health Outcomes 
Population statistics by district were obtained from projections based on the 2008 census data 
produced by the National Statistics Office (Mawhinney 1979).  We used population data for 2006 and 
2011 to estimate per capita figures.  Data on annual household consumption expenditure were 
obtained from the Integrated Household Surveys for 2005 and 2010, and per capita estimates were 
generated by dividing these figures by household size.  Data on neonatal, post-neonatal (1-59 month) 
and under five mortality were based on the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey data (2006) and DHS 
data (2010) as the closest time point available to 2011, using methods described previously (Kanyuka 
et al. 2016).   
The district level analysis excludes the district of Likoma because of its small population size and 
combined Mwanza and Neno district, as Neno district was formed as a separate district after 2006.  In 
the analysis of household surveys, urban and rural households were combined at district level (e.g. 
Blantyre city was combined with Blantyre district (Kanyuka et al. 2016)).  
Qualitative Data 
We conducted 41 semi-structured key informant interviews with government stakeholders at central 
and district levels to determine how they allocate and prioritise funding across districts for health, and 
to identify potential problems and bottlenecks in resource flows (Table 1).  District-level interviews 
were conducted in ten districts, representing all three regions, and with mixed performance in terms 
of child health outcomes. Stakeholders were sampled purposively; snowballing was used to identify 
further relevant stakeholders. Interviews were recorded and transcribed by a professional 
transcriptionist in all but two cases where consent was not granted (notes were taken instead).  
Data Analysis 
We estimated per capita district health expenditures by source for 2006 and for 2011 for each of the 
26 districts of Malawi, both in real terms and as a share of total per capita funding for each district. 
We illustrated findings for each year using bar charts and examined changes in funding levels over 
time for each funding source.  Pairwise correlation analyses were performed to assess the relationship 
between district per capita health financing levels by source and district level outcomes (neonatal 
mortality, under 5 mortality and post-neonatal mortality) in 2005/2006 and in 2010/2011 to examine 
the relationship between changes in financing levels and changes in outcomes between these two 
time periods.  The pairwise correlation coefficient and p-value for the correlation coefficient are 
presented.   
To examine the distribution of health sector funding in relation to district socio-economic status we 
estimated concentration indices for each financing source, and concentration and Lorenz curves.   We 
compared the distribution of funding, depicted by the concentration curve, against the 45 degree line 
of perfect equality.  If the concentration curve lies above (below) the 45 degree line, the distribution 
is pro-poor (pro-rich).  A positive concentration index indicates a pro-rich distribution and a negative 
index a pro-poor distribution, with values lying between 0 and 1.  Heat maps were generated to 
represent data on health expenditure by source and child mortality graphically using the ArcGIS 
software.  All costs were inflated to 2013 Kwacha prices using average annual inflation rates, and are 
presented in 2013 constant prices.  AidData disbursements are reported in US dollars. They were 
inflated into 2013 prices based on annual US inflation rates, and converted into Kwacha using the 
average 2013 exchange rate (1 USD=369 Kwacha).  
Interview data were analysed using thematic content analysis. The themes were driven by the 
interview guide, although open coding was undertaken on a sample of four transcripts to identify any 
new themes emerging. Themes centred around decisions on budget guidelines, allocation of health 
resources, and changes over time in financing procedures and resource flows.  
Results 
All districts received funds from government, external sources and out of pocket payments by 
individuals in 2006 and in 2011. However, there were wide disparities between districts, both in the 
total per capita health expenditures and the levels of expenditure by source (Figure 2a and Figure 2b).  
There was also a substantial change in the levels of total health expenditure per capita over the period 
2006-2011.  Average total health expenditure per capita at district level increased from 7,181 Kwacha 
to 15,312 Kwacha between 2006 and 2011 (more than doubling in real terms).  Total health 
expenditure per capita varied from 3,449 Kwacha in Lilongwe district to 12,486 Kwacha in Nsanje in 
2006; and from 4,300 Kwacha in Lilongwe district to 39,149 Kwacha in Nsanje in 2011.   There was an 
increase in total health expenditure in 22 out of 26 districts between 2006 and 2011 by an average of 
142%, and a decline by an average of 9% in the remaining 4 districts.   
Domestic expenditure per capita increased from an average of 390 Kwacha per capita across all 
districts to 2,284 Kwacha (a six fold increase) over the period.  The increase in domestic funding was 
noted in every district, with an average relative increase of 82%.  The highest level of domestic funding 
per capita was in Nkhata Bay in 2006 (1,129 Kwacha), and in Mwanza in 2011 (6,910 Kwacha), and the 
lowest level in Lilongwe in 2006 (166 Kwacha) and Dedza in 2011 (1,073 Kwacha).   
External funding per capita increased from 6,217 Kwacha per capita across all districts to 12,377 
Kwacha between 2006 and 2011, almost doubling over this period.  There was an increase in external 
funding in 18 districts and a reduction in 8, with an average relative increase of 157%.  There was 
substantial variation in external expenditure levels (ranging from 2,452 Kwacha in Lilongwe to 11,498 
in Chitipa in 2006; and from 2,446 Kwacha in Lilongwe to 36,590 Kwacha in Nsanje in 2011).  External 
expenditure levels were also substantially larger than domestic health expenditure levels in all districts 
though the relative difference in magnitude reduced over time.  External funding levels ranged from 
seven times higher than domestic funding in Nkhata Bay (2006) to 54 times higher in Zomba in the 
same year (the average ratio of external to domestic funding across districts was 18).  In 2011, the 
ratio of external to domestic funding went from just under two in Dowa to 15 in Nsanje (average ratio 
of six).   
Out of pocket expenditure increased minimally from an average of 574 Kwacha per capita to 651 
Kwacha between 2006 and 2011, varying from 155 Kwacha in Ntchisi to 1,130 Kwacha in Ntcheu in 
2006; and from 161 Kwacha in Chitipa to 1,712 Kwacha in Blantyre in 2011. Out of pocket expenditures 
per capita increased in 16 districts by 5 % and reduced in 10 over this period by 5%.   
The financing mix has evolved substantially between 2006 and 2011, with domestic funding 
accounting for 6% of total health expenditure in 2006 increasing to 19% in 2011; and external funding 
reducing from 85% to 74% and the share of out of pocket payments reducing from 10% to 7%. In both 
years, external expenditure was the biggest source of district level funding making up more than ¾ of 
total health expenditure (Table 2).   
In 2006, higher levels of domestic and external expenditure per capita were associated with 
significantly lower levels of post-neonatal mortality (Table 3; Figure 3), with a borderline significant 
negative association also found between domestic funding and under five mortality.  A positive 
association was found between external funding and neonatal mortality, which was significant at 
p<0.1.  Districts with higher levels of OOP expenditure had significantly higher levels of under-five 
mortality and post-neonatal mortality.  In 2011 the relationship between domestic funding and under 
five and post-neonatal mortality was slightly stronger. For external funding the positive association 
with NMR was maintained.  In 2011, there was no longer a significant association between OOP and 
mortality.   There was no association between the changes in financing indicators between 2006 and 
2011 and changes in mortality rates.   
In both years the distribution of OOP was the most pro-rich of the three financing sources, followed 
by domestic funding, with external financing being the least pro-rich (Table 4, Figures 4a and 4b).  
While OOP became more concentrated among wealthier districts between the two time periods, the 
distribution of external funding moved from pro-rich to proportional, and the concentration of 
domestic funding among wealthier districts reduced somewhat. 
Qualitative Findings 
Interviews with various government representatives revealed a number of issues with domestic and 
external funds.   
Respondents highlighted a number of challenges in relation to the receipt of government funds.  
First, government funds were universally perceived to be insufficient relative to needs, with the 
budget reportedly remaining constant despite inflation.  
 “[…] the budget eventually gives problem[s] when the prices of commodities have gone up. 
For example if you have a budget of maybe a rim of paper at 2000 in June you shouldn’t 
expect that 2000 to be there in October, normally the prices never go down they go up [...]” 
In addition, the amounts received were generally lower than the amounts that had been budgeted, 
with the shortfall varying between 5-10% and 90%, especially during the second half of the financial 
year.  
“[…] last year we would get 10% of our monthly funding maybe instead of getting 2 million 
we would get 200 thousand, which is not even enough to pay our utility bills. So it brought 
the council in a deficit position to pay utility bills and other things […].” – Director of Finance 
Second, respondents reported delays in the receipt of funds, particularly at the beginning of the 
financial year. Delays were caused at the central level by districts not submitting their reports on time, 
and the erratic behaviour of donors due to “ministry is not meeting the conditionalities or the ministry 
is not accounting for the resources” (Ministry of Finance representative), and at the district level due 
to having a single pooled account for all sectors, as if the person managing the account (director of 
finance) was away, the release of funds would be delayed.  
Delays in receiving less-than-budgeted funds resulted in the scale-down of health-related activities. 
For instance, one respondent reported the “child day”2 did not happen because the funding did not 
arrive on time. Others complained of widespread effects on health service provision, including 
maintenance of ambulances, and transportation of essential supplies to providers due to a lack of fuel. 
 “The consequences we cannot feed the patient, we cannot order drugs in time, we cannot 
pay our suppliers in time, we cannot pay locum in time, we cannot maintain our vehicles, 
ambulances in time, so the consequences are so many and they really affect health delivery 
in the district” – Director of Finance 
Insufficient funds resulted in the DHMT meeting to re-prioritise activities, which resulted in the budget 
process being less efficient and more top-down and less consultative than originally intended.  
Districts often acquired debts from suppliers, which affected relationships and sometimes ended up 
in court summons, with some DHMT members referring to themselves as “firefighter rather than an 
implementer”. 
 “Those delays affect our services […] we received a court summons from some suppliers, 
they are taking us to court because we have delayed paying them for the services rendered 
[…]. Actually we have had water disconnected; the water board is always on our neck.  […] 
even food, […] we are supposed to feed our patients but the suppliers sometimes refuse to 
give us food […] so instead of giving patients meat twice a week you may end up giving them 
beans throughout the week […].” – District Health Officer 
District council officers sometimes agreed to re-allocate funds between sectors and to rely on partner 
funds, resulting in further dependency. 
External funding via the SWAP or directly from donors often served to complement the district 
implementation plan (DIP) by supporting items or activities that were within the DIP and had no 
central level funding.  A DHMT member reported if “what we included in the DIP has no resource[s] 
from the government, we lobby with the partners that are willing to support us in those interventions 
in our DIP”. District health officers reported that RMNCH was a high priority for donors and districts 
when developing budgets, comprising a large share of the health budget, although largely funded by 
donors. 
                                                          
2 Child Health Days take place in the whole of Malawi and involve the delivery of a package of interventions, 
including exclusive breastfeeding, feeding a sick child, vitamin A rich foods, de-worming, hand washing 
with soap, use of iodized salt and insecticide treated nets 
(http://www.unicef.org/esaro/5479_child_health_days.html)  
“… if you talk about child, maternal health, for example the EPI3 program, which is the main 
core of child health it takes about probably three tenths of the whole budget.” – District 
Health Officer 
 “RMNCH as a program is getting more funding from implementing donors so […] we can say 
overall (…) it is better off as compared to other programs that have inadequate resources.” – 
District Health Officer 
There were concerns about the high degree of dependency on partner funds for the health sector at 
the district level, so that “the major investment comes from partners” and district governments 
“provide the guidance and supervision” (District Health Officer). This resulted in concerns about the 
sustainability of funds going forward. 
There were also concerns about the lack of coordination of partner funds, which may lead to skewed 
allocation of resources to areas favoured by the partners rather than those where there is the most 
need.  
“Sometimes we feel like some partners the way they are coming in to support health, they 
pump in a lot of money in one program but if you look at the needs of the district, [...] you 
can say if these other resources can be used in other programs that could be better.” – 
Director of Finance 
Respondents discussed the variety of activities that are funded by different funding sources.  Whilst a 
large part of external funding was used to fund “training, orientation, refresher courses [and] maternal 
death audits” (District Health Officer), other recurrent transactions (ORT) funds from government 
were used to keep health services running, such as “fuel, food for patients, water bills, sometimes the 
drugs” (District Reproductive Health Coordinator).  
Discussion 
This paper presents the results of an in-depth analysis of health financing in Malawi at the sub-national 
level for all 26 districts in the years 2006 and 2011. District level analysis showed that per capita 
spending from all sources varied substantially across districts and that funding levels increased 
considerably between 2006 and 2011 in real terms, due to substantial growth in external and domestic 
funding levels.  Districts in Malawi are heavily dependent on external funding for health, accounting 
for over 70% of funds in both years considered, which was of concern to government stakeholders.  
Domestic funding levels increased six-fold over the period, with increases noted in all districts.  
                                                          
3 EPI: Extended Program for Immunisation 
However, domestic funds only accounted for 19% of total health expenditure in 2011.  Out of pocket 
funding levels were found to remain relatively constant over time, with OOP reducing slightly as a 
share of total health expenditure over the period of study.  All funding sources were concentrated 
among wealthier districts (pro-rich), with the concentration being greatest for OOP, followed by 
domestic expenditure. External funding was the least pro-rich of the three sources, and moved 
towards being proportional in 2011. A previous study of aid allocations at the traditional authority 
level in Malawi found that poorer traditional authorities were more likely to receive aid (Marty et al. 
2017). Although external funding was found to be complementary to government funds, local 
government representatives reported external funds were not allocated in an efficient manner at the 
district level.  The high reliance on donor funding at district level is concerning, as such funding is 
known to be volatile (Celasun & Walliser 2008) (Martinez-Alvarez et al. 2017) affecting recipient 
country ability to plan. Consideration of methods for increasing domestic resource generation is 
needed through earmarked taxes for health, increased efficiency in tax revenue collection and more 
effective lobbying for funds to health (Meheus & McIntyre 2017) (Mcintyre et al. 2017). The pro-rich 
distribution of funding is also concerning, and greater attention should be given to equity in the 
allocation of funding sub-nationally.  
Domestic and external financing were associated with lower levels of post-neonatal mortality - the 
group which saw the greatest decline in mortality; but there was no association between changes in 
financing and outcomes over time, possibly because of the short time period considered. A previous 
study also reported that infant mortality levels were significantly lower in areas where external 
funding was higher (Dionne et al. 2013); and a study using the same Aiddata dataset found that 
traditional authorities with higher prevalence of malaria were less likely to receive aid (Marty et al. 
2017) though those that received some aid had lower prevalence than those that received none.  
Another study showed that higher levels of public health expenditure were associated with 
substantially lower levels of infant and under five mortality (Miquelon & Vallerand 2008). Out of 
pocket payments were associated with higher levels of post-neonatal mortality, but this effect 
disappeared over time.    Out of pocket payments have been shown to be associated with lower access 
to care (Anselmi et al. 2017), which would lead to worse outcomes.  It is also possible that households 
in districts with worse outcomes incur more expense, as a result of greater need for care.    The 
qualitative data also highlighted the heavy reliance on external funding at district level, and concerns 
about the sustainability of donor funds in the longer term.  Reliance on donor funding was partly 
adopted as a coping strategy to deal with delays in the receipt of domestic funding, which was 
considered insufficient to meet needs.  External project funding was usually earmarked by districts for 
specific activities (e.g. training) or areas of joint donor and government priority (RMNCH services), 
suggesting coordination between donors and government for these funds.  Prioritisation of donor 
funding for specific activities and conditions that were underfunded is a rationale response that has 
been reported elsewhere e.g. (Mayhew 2003).  Other studies have highlighted the risks of reliance on 
donor funding pushing funding decisions away from local communities, with resource allocation and 
funding decisions being driven by donors (Jenniskens et al. 2012), and the potential misalignment of 
priorities (Stierman et al. 2013).   We found evidence that districts in Malawi had some influence over 
how donor funding was used, and that external funding was allocated more equitably than other 
financing sources at district level.  Misalignment of priorities is more likely to occur with vertical rather 
than sector wide support, and explains the preference of district managers for the latter form of 
funding.  While increasing levels of external funds is positive, one concern is that these displace 
domestic funds.  While we found that domestic funding levels were lower than that of external, we 
did not find evidence of reduction on domestic funding in response to increased external funding, 
though some general budget support may have been captured in our estimate of domestic funding.  
Global resource tracking studies have found that countries with higher levels of external assistance 
tend to have lower levels of domestic funding (Lu et al. 2010), with some evidence pointing to the 
fungibility of development assistance for health at country level elsewhere (Gagne & Deci 2005). 
Other district coping strategies to deal with delayed and insufficient domestic resources included 
dropping activities, or transferring funds across sectors, similar to that reported in Tanzania 
(Frumence et al. 2014).  While communities are engaged with district managers in the development 
of health plans, decisions to re-allocate funds across sectors or to cancel or modify planned activities 
were usually made by district stakeholders without lower level consultation.  The challenge of 
securing funding to implement activities was especially great in poorer districts, as domestic funding 
was more highly concentrated in wealthier districts.  The concentration of domestic funding in 
wealthier districts may partly stem from the decentralised nature of health financing in Malawi.  A 
study in Indonesia also found that the introduction of financial decentralisation benefitted wealthier 
districts more than poorer districts (Abdullah & Stoelwinder 2007). 
This study is subject to some methodological limitations.  First, we present our analysis in relation to 
two years (2006 and 2011), however, in practice the period of focus for each data source was not 
entirely consistent, with domestic funding reflecting the financial year 2005/2006 and 2010/2011, 
and out of pocket funding reflecting the calendar years 2005 and 2010, and mortality estimates 
derived from 2006 and 2010 sources.  However, we do not expect major year on year variation in 
funding levels or outcomes.  We estimated domestic expenditure from budget books “approved 
budget” figures, rather than using actual expenditure, as these were considered the most reliable 
source of financing data at the time of study.  However, our measure of domestic funding may 
include donor funding that is channelled through the Ministry of Finance as general budget support, 
as there was no mechanism for identifying and removing such funds from our estimates; it also 
includes locally generated funds.  Therefore, although we report an increase in domestic funding 
over time, this may partly be a reflection of the consolidation of general budget support which 
includes external funding, in addition to increased domestically sourced revenue.  Further, the 
approved budget figures are generated half way through the financial year so any major deviations 
in the second half of the year from what was budgeted will not be captured.  At the district level we 
estimated external expenditure by allocating an equal expenditure to each year for each project, as 
annual disbursement information was not available. However, there will likely be some disparity 
between our estimates and actual funds received in a given year.  Further, external funding captured 
within AidData represents just over 80% of all aid, so actual external funding levels will be higher 
than that reported.  Although there is potential risk of double counting general budget support 
within our domestic and external funding categories, in practice, we did not find any general budget 
support funding within those disbursements which had been assigned to the health sector by the 
Ministry of Finance, suggesting this was not an issue.  The geocoded AidData database for Malawi is 
sanctioned by the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning & Development and includes data from 
nearly 30 donors. We believe this is the most accurate estimate available of external expenditure in 
Malawi at the sub-national level.  When analysing associations between financing and outcomes, we 
only explored associations between financing and outcome variables at a particular point in time, 
and we did not control for other factors which may have affected outcome, nor did we account for 
lagged effects.   Further, our analysis is aggregated at the district level, and we examined 
associations between general health aid and child mortality.  Associations between funding to child 
health and child mortality may have been different, but it was not possible to disaggregate domestic 
and out of pocket payments by health conditions or population groups.   
Finally, the qualitative analysis is also subject to limitations. First, respondents may not have felt 
comfortable being recorded and may not have wanted to share some of their personal views on 
sensitive topics of health financial management. Second, although the coding tree was developed by 
two researchers, the rest of the coding and analysis was undertaken by one researcher, which may 
have influenced the results presented here.  We were also unable to development partners to 
obtain their perspective on the allocation of external funding in Malawi nor to interviews patients or 
households to understand their perceptions of out of pocket payments and changes over time. 
In order to improve the availability of domestic funding for health, stronger public financial 
management practices are needed to ensure the timely availability of adequate levels of funding and 
to respect local level accountability in planning for how funds will be used.  While the ongoing reliance 
on donor funding is essential in the short term, pooled mechanisms have clear advantages for local 
planners, due to the greater autonomy in allocating funds to address local priorities, and these should 
be allocated directly to districts to minimise delays in the receipt of funds.  Although pooled funding 
was frozen during the cash gate scandal, such mechanisms should be encouraged going forward.   
Given the increased decision making power of districts, donors might also consider allocating funds 
directly to districts to avoid delays associated with transfers through the Ministry of Finance.   
While generating additional domestic resources is clearly a key priority to meet the resource gap 
needed to achieve and make progress towards universal health coverage (Deci 1971) (Deci et al. 1999), 
governments also need to keep a close eye on how these resources are allocated sub-nationally to 
maximise equity and ensure allocations are commensurate to health need.  To do so will require 
investment in resource tracking tools to facilitate consistent and reliable measurement of funding at 
the sub national level for consistent years and time frames, and also tracking funding by beneficiary 
group.  WHO’s systems of health accounts methodology which has been employed in a number of 
countries is a promising move in this direction  together with AidData’s geocoded datasets which offer 
the opportunity to explore external funding sub-nationally which is not currently possible with the 
OECD’s creditor reporting system.  However, more disaggregated reporting of such funds within 
AidData’s database would be helpful to more precisely determine annual expenditures. 
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Table 1. Stakeholders interviewed 
Stakeholder Number 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) 1 
Ministry of Health (MoH) 2 
District Council Director of Finance  9 
District Health Officer (DHO) /District Medical 
Officer (DMO) /District Nursing Officer (DNO) 
9 
District Health Accountant (DHA) 8 
District Reproductive Health coordinator (DRHC) 
/ Safe Motherhood Coordinator (SMC) 
9 
 
  
Table 2 Health expenditure by source as a proportion of total health expenditure by district in the 
financial years 2006 and 2011 
District 2006 2011 
Domestic 
per capita 
(% Total) 
External 
per capita 
(% Total) 
OOP per 
capita (% 
Total) 
Domestic 
per capita 
(% Total) 
External 
per capita 
(% Total) 
OOP per 
capita (% 
Total) 
Balaka 4.5% 83.9% 11.6% 6.5% 92.1% 1.4% 
Blantyre 9.9% 72.6% 17.5% 16.5% 61.3% 22.2% 
Chikwawa 6.1% 76.6% 17.3% 12.5% 85.9% 1.6% 
Chiradzulu 3.9% 90.0% 6.0% 14.7% 81.9% 3.4% 
Chitipa 4.2% 94.0% 1.8% 26.1% 72.2% 1.6% 
Dedza 5.7% 76.7% 17.6% 23.3% 55.7% 20.9% 
Dowa 6.1% 72.6% 21.2% 26.2% 49.3% 24.5% 
Karonga 5.5% 89.7% 4.7% 28.0% 67.0% 5.0% 
Kasungu 5.3% 86.2% 8.5% 9.3% 81.6% 9.1% 
Lilongwe 4.8% 71.1% 24.1% 25.0% 56.9% 18.1% 
Machinga 6.7% 86.3% 7.0% 28.3% 66.2% 5.5% 
Mangochi 5.0% 82.5% 12.5% 8.4% 88.6% 3.0% 
Mchinji 8.6% 84.1% 7.3% 29.7% 61.2% 9.1% 
Mulanje 4.4% 87.9% 7.6% 27.6% 66.2% 6.2% 
Mwanza 5.9% 87.6% 6.5% 29.4% 69.3% 1.3% 
Mzimba 2.8% 92.4% 4.8% 19.0% 75.7% 5.3% 
Nkhatabay 12.7% 84.5% 2.8% 29.2% 67.5% 3.4% 
Nkhotakota 6.7% 84.6% 8.7% 16.3% 78.9% 4.7% 
Nsanje 3.4% 89.4% 7.2% 6.1% 93.2% 0.7% 
Ntcheu 7.0% 65.7% 27.3% 28.1% 62.9% 8.9% 
Ntchisi 4.9% 93.4% 1.7% 30.3% 63.8% 5.9% 
Phalombe 3.6% 84.1% 12.3% 5.0% 93.6% 1.5% 
Rumphi 6.8% 89.4% 3.8% 13.1% 85.1% 1.8% 
Salima 6.4% 87.2% 6.4% 7.8% 88.7% 3.5% 
Thyolo 3.7% 91.0% 5.3% 20.6% 71.5% 7.9% 
Zomba 1.7% 93.8% 4.5% 8.2% 89.0% 2.8% 
District average 5.6% 84.5% 9.8% 19.1% 74.0% 6.9% 
Note to table: these figures have been rounded to the nearest decimal, hence the rounded figures 
may not always add up to 100. 
  
Table 3 Comparing associations between financing levels and newborn and child health outcomes in 
2006 and 2011 
  Neonatal 
mortality 
Under five 
mortality 
Mortality 
between 1-59 
months 
Domestic health 
expenditure per 
capita 
2006 Corr 
(p-value) 
-0.057 
(0.783) 
-0.38* 
(0.055) 
-0.41** 
(0.037) 
2011 Corr 
(p-value) 
-0.04 
(0.815) 
-0.39* 
(0.052) 
-0.44** 
(0.025) 
External health 
expenditure per 
capita 
2006 Corr 
(p-value) 
0.34* 
(0.094) 
-0.22 
(0.279) 
-0.40** 
(0.041) 
2011 Corr 
(p-value) 
0.38* 
(0.054) 
0.03 
(0.886) 
-0.17 
(0.395) 
OOP per capita 2006 Corr 
(p-value) 
-0.04 
(0.838) 
0.41** 
(0.040) 
0.48** 
(0.012) 
2011 Corr 
(p-value) 
-0.15 
(0.458) 
0.14 
(0.501) 
0.25 
(0.220) 
*p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
  
Table 4 Concentration indices for each source of financing by year 
Equity measure 2006 2011 
Domestic expenditure 0.20*** 0.15*** 
External expenditure 0.19*** 0.06 
Out of pocket 
payments 
0.41*** 
 
0.50*** 
Income (Gini 
coefficient) 
0.45 0.46 
*** denotes that statistical significance of the concentration index, p<0.001. 
 
Figure 1 Schematic representation of the flow of funds in the Malawian health sector 
  
Note to figure: arrows represent (financial) resource flows. 
  
Figure 2a  District health expenditure per capita by source in 2006 (2013 Kwacha) 
 
Figure 2b. District health expenditure per capita by source in 2011 (2013 Kwacha) 
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 Figure 3. Heat maps showing the district distribution of health expenditure per capita by source (Kwacha) and child mortality rate indicators
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Figure 4a: Lorenz and Concentration curves for health sector funding 2006 
 
This graph illustrates the concentration curves for each source of financing, together with the Lorenz 
curve for income, and the 45 degree line.  If the concentration curve lies above (below) the 45 
degree line, the distribution is pro-poor (pro-rich).   
Figure 4b: Lorenz and Concentration curves for health sector funding 2011
 
This graph illustrates the concentration curves for each source of financing, together with the Lorenz 
curve for income, and the 45 degree line.  If the concentration curve lies above (below) the 45 
degree line, the distribution is pro-poor (pro-rich).   
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